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ABSTRACT: “What is truth?” Pilot asked Jesus of 
Nazareth. For many in academe today this question seems 
quaintly passé. Rejection of “truth” goes hand-in-hand with 
the rejection of epistemological realism. Educational thought 
over the last decade has instead been dominated by anti-
realist, instrumentalist ideas of two types: first by 
psychological constructivism and later by social 
constructivism. Social constructivism subsequently has been 
pressed to its logical conclusion in the form of relativistic 
multiculturalism. Proponents of both psychological 
constructivism and social constructivism value knowledge 
for its utility and eschew as irrelevant speculation any notion 
that knowledge is actually about reality. The arguments are 
largely grounded in the discourse of science and science 
education where science is “western” science; neither 
universal nor about what is really real. The authors defended 
the notion of science as universal in a previous article. The 
present purpose is to offer a commonsense argument in 
defense of critical realism and the epistemically and 
ontologically distinguished position of science (rather than 
privileged) within a framework of epistemological pluralism. 
The paper begins with a brief cultural survey of events 
during the thirty-year period from 1960-1990 that brought 
many educators to break with realism and concludes with 
comments on the pedagogical importance of realism. 
Understanding the cultural milieu of the past forty years is 
critical to understanding why traditional philosophical 
attacks on social constructivist ideas have proved impotent 
defenders of scientific realism. 
 
 
 
 
 
The good Dr. Johnson and James Boswell 
were walking down a London street one day 
discussing George Berkeley's philosophy of 
immaterialism. Dr. Johnson, unconvinced 
by Berkeley's logic, said to Boswell, "I 
refute it thus!" Upon which he turned and 
soundly kicked the street curb with his big 
toe – much to Boswell's amusement! 
 
Along with Boswell, one is amused. Of course, 
Samuel Johnson's refutation of immaterialism was 
no philosophical threat to Berkeley. What Johnson 
did was to present dramatically the wisdom of 
common folk and everyday, ordinary life. For 
most people philosophy is an esoteric, arcane 
discipline with little apparent practical value. 
Unfortunately, that is not always a wise view. For 
example, Duschl (1985) argued that for 25 years 
science curriculum developers ignored concurrent 
development in the philosophy of science, 
resulting in impoverished curricula. In the years 
since Duschl’s article there has been much more 
interest in both the history and philosophy of 
science as these fields pertain to education. 
Indeed, educational thought over the last decade 
has been dominated by instrumentalist philosophy 
of two types: first by psychological constructivism 
and later by social constructivism. Social 
constructivism has been pressed to its logical 
conclusion in the form of relativistic (i.e., 
philosophical) multiculturalism. Proponents of 
both psychological constructivism and social 
constructivism value knowledge for its utility and 
eschew any notion that knowledge is actually 
about reality as irrelevant speculation, thus the 
label instrumentalism. The arguments are largely 
grounded in the discourse of science and science 
education where science is “western” science; 
neither universal nor about what is really real. We 
have defended the notion of science as universal 
in a previous article (Cobern & Loving, 2001). In 
this paper, our purpose is to offer a commonsense 
argument in defense of critical realism. The paper 
begins with a brief cultural survey of events 
during the thirty-year period from 1960-1990 that 
brought many educators to break with realism and 
concludes with comments on the pedagogical 
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importance of realism. Understanding the cultural 
milieu of the past forty years is critical to 
understanding why traditional philosophical 
attacks (e.g., Slezak, 1994 a&b; Suchting, 1992 & 
1995) and ideological attacks (e.g., Gross, Levitt, 
& Lewis, 1996) on social constructivist ideas have 
proved impotent defenders of scientific realism for 
most educators including science educators. 
From Where We Have Come 
The National Science Foundation (USA) funded 
major science education curriculum reforms from 
the late 1950s through the late 1960s. Garrison & 
Bentley (1990, p. 188) called this decade the 
“golden era” of North American and European 
science education curriculum development. 
Prather (1990, p. 12) called the events of the 
1960s a "revolution in science education." A mere 
two decades after this “golden era” for science 
education, however, one finds that the USA and 
other nations were once again agonizing over the 
inadequacies of school science (Duschl, 1985). 
Mallinson (1984, p. 2) wrote of the ironic déjà vu 
– that criticisms of the 1980s were “little more 
than plagiarism of statements that appeared in the 
literature of the 1950s and 1960s.” According to 
Duschl, “Mallinson’s irony” could in part be 
attributed to the philosophical and historical 
datedness of the science curriculum reformers. 
 
The point being made is that during the 
same period of time (1956-1966) in which 
various science contents were being 
revised and rewritten by scientists to 
produce curricula which would instruct 
students on how to operate and think like a 
scientist; the prevailing ideas among 
historians and philosophers of science 
about the nature of scientific inquiry were 
being challenged and changed. (Duschl, 
1985, p. 548) 
 
Nadeau & Desautels (1984, p. 7-8) concur: 
 
Numerous studies in recent years have 
shown that science teaching has not 
achieved the objectives set for it some 
twenty years ago when, under American 
influence, the most extensive renewal ever 
undertaken in science education was 
begun. It is almost universally agreed that 
this endeavor was a failure. 
 
They go on to argue that by “by giving insufficient 
thought and attention to the nature of scientific 
knowledge and the conditions under which it has 
been developed, science teaching reinforces 
beliefs and myths that are inherent in scientistic 
ideology (Nadeau & Désautels, 1984, p. 8). They 
argued that school science promoted the “myth of 
scientism.” This myth includes: 
 
• Scientism: scientific knowledge deserves 
unquestioned epistemic privilege. 
• Naive realism: scientific knowledge is about 
the way things really are. 
• Naive empiricism: “the human mind as a 
tabula rosa on which knowledge is recorded 
item by item” (p. 24). 
• Naive verificationism: scientific knowledge is 
developed via inductive processes. 
• Objectivism: the scientist is a completely 
disinterested, objective participant in scientific 
endeavors. 
• Excessive rationalism: “The conquest of truth 
is viewed as a cumulative and consequently 
continuous process that has gone on, 
uninterrupted by precipitate change or sudden 
alteration, since the days of Babylon” (p. 48). 
 
This Mallinson-Duschl-Nadeau/Désautels analysis 
was by most accounts correct. The early NSF 
curricular efforts leaned too uncritically on a 
colloquial version of positivism (Cobern, 1997) at 
a time that logical positivism had lost almost all its 
traction amongst philosophers and historians of 
science. 
It would, however, be incorrect to assume 
that the 1960s NSF science education curriculum 
reforms lacked any innovation. Reminiscent of 
Duschl’s 1985 title, DeBoer (1991, p. 164) claims 
that in the twenty years preceding the NSF reform 
efforts, “science teaching had not kept pace” with 
new conceptions of science as described by 
Jerome Bruner and Joseph Schwab. Theirs was not 
like the inductivist-realist philosophy of science. 
That received view was “characterized by an 
urgent desire for ‘objectivity’, empiricism and 
elimination of metaphysics” (Elkana, 2000, p. 
463) and, 
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the tradition in science teaching was to 
feed the student with huge amounts of 
information about ‘objective’ facts, and 
‘proved’ laws of nature, and after the law 
had been memorized, the teacher 
performed a demonstration in class… 
[that] served as an experimental 
confirmation… (Elkana, 2000, p. 465) 
 
Bruner (1960), in contrast, saw science textbooks 
as little more than collections of facts and ideas. 
He was concerned about the structure of science 
textbooks and science curriculum. He observed 
that science textbooks and curricula did not reflect 
the structures of scientific disciplines at a time 
when increasing importance was being attributed 
to the structures of disciplines. Bruner argued that: 
 
Grasping the structure of the subject is 
understanding it in a way that permits 
many other things to be related to it 
meaningfully. To learn structure, in short, 
is to learn how things are related. (Bruner, 
1960, p. 7) 
 
Similarly, Schwab (1962, p. 24) complained that 
school science was taught “as a nearly unmitigated 
rhetoric of conclusions in which the current and 
temporary constructions of scientific knowledge 
are conveyed as empirical, literal, and irrevocable 
truths.” He went on to argue that the methods and 
processes of doing science were missing in current 
science textbooks and curricula. Hence, the 
fluidity of science was missing. The 1960s science 
curricula funded by the National Science 
Foundation were innovative in that they were 
attempts to reflect the structure of various 
scientific disciplines and to present science as 
inquiry rather than as the rhetoric of conclusions, 
to use Schwab's phrase.  
What we see from the Mallinson-Duschl-
Nadeau/Désautels analyses of the mid 1980s is 
that the structure of disciplines and inquiry 
concepts promoted by Bruner and Schwab 
represented a positivist-instrumentalist view of 
scientific knowledge that emphasized method: 
 
the one and only true method of science is 
the method of empiricism, of mathematical 
positivism, and… the elimination of 
metaphysics…. science develops by 
empirical refutation of old theories, by 
objective formulation of ‘critical 
experiments’ and by empirical decision, as 
to which of the alternative theories is the 
better predicting instrument. (Elkana, 
2000, p. 470) 
 
Despite contrary philosophical views raised by 
Hanson (1958), Kuhn (1962) and Toulmin (1960) 
the positivist-instrumentalist view of science was 
strongly supported in the science community. In 
education this view mainly served to support the 
interests of the science community1 that there be 
an adequate educational pipeline delivering future 
scientists (Cobern, 1996 & 1997). This is of little 
surprise given that a major stimulus for 1960s 
science curriculum reform effort was the Sputnik 
scare and the challenge of keeping scientific and 
technological pace with the Soviet Union. 
Regarding the lay citizenry, however, the 
reformers of the period simply assumed that 
“science would be inherently interesting to all 
students if it were presented in the way it is known 
to scientists” (Hofstein & Yager, 1982, p. 542). 
 From the beginning, critics of the NSF 
sponsored curriculum reforms argued that “the 
need was for an enlightened citizenry, not an 
educational elite” (DeBoer, 1991, p. 173). 
Gradually, Paul DeHart Hurd’s (1998) notion of 
public science literacy or public scientific literacy 
took root. From the 1970s on there was a new 
progressivism in science education that spawned a 
series of science curriculum efforts that were more 
student-, socially-, and culturally-oriented. This 
was a remarkable educational shift from science 
education serving the interests of science to 
serving the public interest in science. DeBoer 
(1991) reminds us that during the 1920s, 1930s 
and 1940s the control of science curricula was in 
the hands of professional educators rather than 
scientists, prompting Joseph Schwab to complain 
that professional educators paid more attention to 
social needs than to subject matter. But, under the 
guidance of Schwab and Bruner that situation was 
reversed during the NSF-curriculum dominated 
1960s; only to have the curriculum focus reversed 
yet again during the 1980s. One must agree with 
the Preacher: “The thing that hath been, it is that 
                                                          
 3 
1 For an excellent discussion of the difference between the interests of 
science and interest in science, see Eger (1989). 
In Defense of Realism 
which shall be; and that which is done is that 
which shall be done: and there is no new thing 
under the sun” (Ecclesiastes 1:9). 
The Challenges to Authority 
In the 1980s, the pendulum of science curriculum 
reform swung away from the subject-centered, 
structure-of-disciplines approach to school 
science. The proposed solution for the most recent 
“crisis in science education” was “to offer science 
that could help people in their everyday lives, that 
would allow them to make a contribution to the 
well-being of society, and that was interesting to 
students” (DeBoer, 1991, p. 198). These efforts 
included Science-Technology-Society programs, 
humanistic approaches to science education, 
values education approaches to science education, 
environmental education, and programs that use 
social issues to structure science education. 
According to DeBoer, Hofstein and Yager (1982) 
championed the use of social issues to structure 
science education arguing that the goals for 
science education must change to meet the current 
needs of society. The need in the 1980s was not to 
produce more scientists but to provide for a 
scientifically literate citizenry. The public knew 
this even if the science and science education 
communities were not so sure; after all, argued 
Yager (1983, p. 652-3) “since the advent of the… 
‘new’ courses as structured by the science 
community, enrollments have dropped by more 
than 50%.” The science curriculum alternatives of 
the 1980s would be a significant step away from 
discipline-focused science education reforms of 
the 1960s. They were not however a step away 
from instrumentalism. Indeed, the very notion of 
science for public use – “what works” – reinforced 
an instrumentalist perspective of science. 
The reaction to this “flight from science” 
(Kromhout & Good, 1983, p. 648) came quickly. 
Critics argued that “as motivation for a coherent 
study of fundamental science” (p. 647) social 
issues and the like were fine. Fundamental science 
education, however, could not be effectively 
organized by such issues and concerns. Moreover, 
the critics were suspicious that alternatively 
oriented science curricula could too easily be 
hijacked by “antiscientific factions and social 
activists” (p. 647). The critics aligned themselves 
with C. P. Snow (1964, p. 10), who was sure that it 
is the scientists who have “the future in their bones" 
and to scientists we must look.2 
 By the end of the 1980s, however, it was 
unmistakable that a broader cultural paradigm 
shift begun in the 1960s had taken place – and 
there would be no going back to the discipline-
oriented school science curricula, either in the 
inductivist-realist mode of the 1950s or the 
positivist-instrumentalist mode of the 1960s. In 
the 1960s, there were four watershed cultural 
events in the United States that had worldwide 
reverberations and set the context for our 
discussion about science and epistemology at the 
onset of the 21st century. Thomas Kuhn (1922-
1996)3, who in 1962 published, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, precipitated the first4 of 
these watershed cultural events. Kuhn advanced 
an historical approach to the philosophy of science 
and his book was an instant commercial success 
that achieved far-reaching influence (Loving & 
Cobern, 2000). It was a book born of its period 
and had the unintended effect of undermining 
scientific privilege by undermining scientific 
claims to realism and universal validity. 
The second watershed cultural event was 
the American Civil Rights Movement. The 1960s 
found a nation increasingly concerned about social 
progress. The youth culture – or youth 
counterculture – of the 1960s was acutely troubled 
by oppressive social practices and the gap between 
American democratic ideals and actual practice. 
Nor was science deemed to have much value for 
the cause. A 1960s popular song referred to the 
decade as the “Eve of Destruction” (McGuire, 
1969), a decade of racial and ethnic hatred. 
Science might take us to space but science can’t 
help us at home: “you may leave here for four 
days in space/ but when you return it’s the same 
old place” (McGuire, 1969). The answers were in 
legislative and judicial action, and in a rising 
acceptance of cultural pluralism. The Civil Rights 
movement, Black Power and Afrocentrism 
advocates raised American cultural awareness 
(later followed by advocates for Feminist, 
                                                          
2 One indication that the critics failed in their efforts is that the Kromhout & 
Good title reappears thirteen years later in Gross, Levitt, & Lewis (1996). 
Indeed, in the eyes of many in science, the situation had only worsened as 
indicated by the two-word addition in the Gross et al title, The Flight From 
Science and Reason. 
3 See <http://www.emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/Kuhnsnap.html> for a 
brief biographical sketch of Kuhn’s life and work. 
4 We are not indicating a chronological order. For the most part, these were 
simultaneous events during the decade. 
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Hispanic, and American Indian awareness). 
Whereas American society was once thought of as 
a “melting pot” (Crouch, 1995; Glazer & 
Moynihan, 1979) needing to be more inclusive, 
the particularities of culture were becoming more 
valued; Americans were becoming more culturally 
aware and accepting of American cultural 
pluralism. 
As with the first watershed cultural event, 
the third event was precipitated by a book. Rachel 
Carson (1907-1964)5 was a science writer and 
ecologist. During the Depression she worked for 
the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries writing radio scripts, 
and for the Baltimore Sun writing articles on 
natural history. She eventually became Editor-in-
Chief of all publications for the U. S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service. However, after the end of World 
War II, “disturbed by the profligate use of 
synthetic chemical pesticides… Carson reluctantly 
changed her focus in order to warn the public 
about the long term effects of misusing pesticides” 
(Lear, 1998). She challenged the agricultural 
practices advocated by both government officials 
and scientists. In 1962, her book, Silent Spring, 
was serialized in the New Yorker and criticism was 
not long in coming – and from all quarters. 
 
Carson was violently assailed by threats of 
lawsuits and derision, including 
suggestions that this meticulous scientist 
was a ‘hysterical woman’ unqualified to 
write such a book. A huge counterattack 
was organized and led by Monsanto, 
Velsicol, American Cyanamid – indeed, 
the whole chemical industry – duly 
supported by the Agriculture Department 
as well as the more cautious in the media. 
(Matthiessen, 2001) 
The force of her arguments and the elegance of 
her prose, however, could not be resisted. The 
Audubon and National Parks Magazine published 
further excerpts from Silent Spring, which rapidly 
was becoming a runaway best seller. Rachel 
Carson opened eyes to a new revelation: products 
of scientific knowledge contribute to 
environmental degradation and pose hazards for 
public health. The net effect was a certain loss of 
scientific innocence. Science may have enabled us 
to win World War II and greatly contributed to the 
economic expansion of the 1950s, but now science 
was discovered to have a darker side. 
                                                          
5 See RachelCarson.org (“a website devoted to the life and legacy of Rachel 
Carson”) at: http://www.rachelcarson.org/. 
The fourth watershed cultural event was 
the Vietnam War. The decade of the 1960s was a 
time of breaking with established norms and 
questioning established verities. The Civil Rights 
Movement brought about a great moral correction 
in American society and politics. The Vietnam 
War not only amplified the cultural dissonance of 
the 1960s, it turned dissonance into tragedy. 
Television brought the war home and people saw 
for the first time the effects of Napalm, Agent 
Orange and other products of scientific knowledge 
in the service of political and military needs. 
Students in particular were prone to change their 
estimation of science because of what they 
perceived as an unholy alliance between the 
community of science and a military-industrial 
complex that developed and produced weapons. 
The rhetoric of values neutrality and objectivity 
was not tenable when the science community 
having taken credit for such things as the Green 
Revolution now denied any responsibility for 
Agent Orange and Napalm. Science not only lost 
its luster, it lost its innocence. Or, as in the words 
of Roger McGuinn of the Byrds (Byrds, 1965): 
 
and I opened my heart to the whole universe/ 
and I found it was loving/ 
and I saw the great blunder my teachers had 
made 
scientific delirium madness 
 
 
                                                          
These watershed events set the stage for a 
significant philosophical development within 
education during the 1990s; what was unthinkable 
amongst educators during the 1950s was quite 
logical by 1990: anti-realism was believable. The 
shift to anti-realism began with concepts of 
psychological anti-realism in the early 1990s that 
evolved into concepts of cultural anti-realism in 
the late 1990s. The early 1990s phase of anti-
realism was dominated by radical constructivism; 
but a psyche-centered radical constructivism later 
gave way to social-centered forms of 
constructivism (social constructivism) and 
ultimately to philosophical multiculturalism.6 
 5 
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The Insignificance of Reality 
Thomas Kuhn’s magnum opus, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1962) belongs to a small 
but elite group of enduring handbooks of human 
culture that transcend categories of specified 
knowledge to challenge traditional ideas and 
heighten the quest for universal knowledge. Most 
of the work in philosophy of science after 1962, 
when The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was 
first published, was directly or indirectly in 
response to Kuhn. Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, 
Dudley Shapere, Stephen Toulmin, Paul 
Feyerabend, David Bloor, Barry Barnes, Bruno 
Latour and David Hull are some of the names 
associated with the last thirty-five years of 
discussion and debate with Kuhn on the nature of 
science.7 What has been particularly intriguing is 
the use of Kuhn’s work in other disciplines. There 
appears to be a wide-ranging appropriation of his 
ideas about science to fields ranging from law to 
linguistics. Those who appropriate Kuhn’s work 
find in him an invitation to rebel from tradition – 
the thrill of revisionism. Although Kuhn did not 
set out to promote such rebellion – his influence 
on revisionists appears enormous; “sociologists, 
political scientists, economists, policy specialists, 
geographers, anthropologists and marketers have 
pounced with glee on the theories of the historical 
school, in part because they find non-positivist 
approaches to the structure of science appealing 
and refreshing” (Donovan, Laudan & Laudan 
1988, p. 7; also see Loving & Cobern, 2000). 
Kuhn’s concepts of “paradigm” and 
“incommensurability” were (mis)taken as 
signaling the passing of science’s privileged 
claims to epistemic realism and universal validity. 
By the 1980s, the unthinkable was now scholarly. 
Collins (1981, p. 3) could tell us that the “natural 
world has a small or non-existent role in the 
construction of scientific knowledge.” According 
to Gergen (1988, p. 37), “the validity of 
theoretical propositions in the science is in no way 
affected by factual evidence...” Of course, 
scientific realism was still defended by some as 
the only credible way to account for the 
instrumental reliability and efficacy of science 
(Boyd, 1983); but Aronowitz (1988, p. 204) – 
amongst others – countered that, “science 
legitimates itself by linking its discoveries to 
power... a connection which determines (not 
merely influences) what counts as reliable 
knowledge.” In education, Ernst von Glasersfeld 
(1989) argued that faith in the objectivity of 
knowledge, particularly of scientific knowledge, 
was misplaced. The difficulties confronting the 
possibility of objective knowledge, he wrote, were 
“brought to the awareness of a wider public by the 
publication of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. There, undisguised and for everyone 
to read, was the explicit statement that” 
(Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 121): 
                                                          
7 For a discussion of Kuhn’s impact, see Loving & Cobern (2000) 
 
…research in parts of philosophy, 
psychology, linguistics, and even art 
history, all converge to suggest that the 
traditional epistemological paradigm is 
somehow askew. That failure to fit is also 
made increasingly apparent by the 
historical study of science… None of these 
crisis-promoting subjects has yet produced 
a viable alternate to the traditional 
epistemological paradigm… (Kuhn 1970, 
p. 121) 
 
Glasersfeld, however, was there to supply the 
“viable alternate”: radical constructivism. 
We noted earlier that for most people 
philosophy is an esoteric, arcane discipline with 
little apparent practical value. There are however, 
moments when philosophy captures widespread 
attention. Such an occasion was the opening night 
of the 1990 annual meeting of the National 
Association for Research in Science Teaching. 
Ernst von Glasersfeld gave a highly stimulating 
lecture on radical constructivism. The concept was 
so well received in the science education 
community that a year later, Good (1991) 
remarked that most science education researchers 
had boarded the “constructivist express;” he 
asked, “is constructivism the new religion in 
science education?” 
 Constructivism refers to a view of learning 
derived from Piaget's concepts of assimilation and 
adaptation, a view further developed in Ausubel 
and Novak's work on meaningful learning. As 
such, this view of constructivism can be 
appropriately termed, pedagogical constructivism, 
or as Glasersfeld (1988, p. 8) rather pejoratively 
prefers, “trivial constructivism.” The heart of 
Glasersfeld's position, however, and what was new 
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for many science educators in 1991, was the 
linkage of pedagogical constructivism with radical 
constructivism. The latter is an epistemological 
(nature of justification) and ontological (nature of 
truth worthiness) philosophy that divorces 
knowing from any notion that reality is the 
referent of knowledge or that knowledge exists 
beyond one’s individual construction. According 
to Glasersfeld (1989a, p. 122) the philosophy of 
radical constructivism, 
 
discards the notion that knowledge could 
or should be a representation of an 
observer-independent world-in-itself and 
replaces it with the demand that the 
conceptual constructs we call knowledge 
be viable in the experiential world of the 
knowing subject. 
 
Interpretations of experience are all that one can 
know (an old empiricist argument, Matthews 
(1994) reminds us. one accepts the validity of 
interpretations in so far as they are pragmatically 
viable. The appeal of this position is that it renders 
moot an historical paradox in Western philosophy. 
 
Radical Constructivism was conceived as 
an attempt to circumvent the paradox of 
traditional epistemology that springs from 
a perennial assumption that is inextricably 
knitted into Western philosophy: the 
assumption that knowledge may be called 
"true" only if it can be considered a more 
or less accurate representation of a world 
that exists ‘in itself’, prior to and 
independent of the knower's experience of 
it. The paradox arises, because the works 
of philosophers by and large imply, if not 
explicitly claim, that they embody a path 
towards Truth and True representations of 
the world, yet none of them has been able 
to provide a feasible test for the accuracy 
of such representations. (Glasersfeld, 
1989b, p.2) 
 
Glasersfeld argues that in fact the ideas of radical 
constructivism can be traced to Copernicus in the 
16th century. Glasersfeld quotes Andreas Osiander’s 
preface in the original publication of De 
Revolutionibus. Osiander wrote that the 
repercussions of Copernicus’ work should not be 
feared because the works of astronomers are not to 
be regarded as truth, but only efficient calculating 
devices (Glasersfeld, 1989b, p. 3). Glasersfeld 
summarizes the radical constructivist position by 
paraphrasing an early 18th century philosopher, 
Giambattista Vico: 
 
God alone can know the real world, 
because He knows how and of what He has 
created it. In contrast, the human knower 
can know only what the human knower has 
constructed. (1989a, p. 123) 
 
To say the least, this is an ironic application of the 
“God of the gaps” argument; but that is acceptable 
in radical constructivism given its presupposition 
of instrumentalism: “Cognition’s purpose is to 
serve the individual’s organization of his or her 
experiential world; cognition’s purpose is not the 
discovery of an objective ontological reality” 
(Staver, 1998, p. 504) 
Both Glasersfeld’s epistemology and his 
ontology were clearly relativistic, but he retained 
the traditional focus of philosophy on the 
individual. His was a psyche-centered view of 
constructivism. The publication of Thomas 
Kuhn’s 1962 book, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, however, which was so critical to the 
acceptance of radical constructivism, was only the 
first of four 1960s watershed events. Very quickly, 
Glasersfeld’s radical constructivist ideas 
precipitated by Kuhn’s book were themselves 
influenced by ideas spawned by the other three 
watershed events that continue to percolate 
through Western intellectual culture. By 1997, 
Geelan was able to identify six thoroughly 
established forms of constructivist theory, only 
one of which was Glasersfeld’s original radical 
constructivism. Amongst education researchers, 
there was a clear shift to social variants of 
constructivism, that is, to social constructivism. 
A World of Multiple Realities 
The American Civil Rights movement of the 
1960s brought about an increased awareness of 
culture and that indeed America was a culturally 
plural society. Moreover, increasing economic and 
cultural globalization brings about greater cultural 
awareness (Reiff, 1993). 
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Increasingly, the world's inhabitants are 
living in close proximity to and 
interspersed among people of different 
ethnic and national backgrounds, and 
frequently at some distance from the land 
of their birth. (Fox-Genevese, 1999, p. 
531-539) 
 
Instead of the “melting pot,” people began to use 
different metaphors, the “tossed salad,” or the “jar 
of jelly beans.” Culturally isolated or insolated it 
is much easier to maintain that one’s own ideas 
are the correct ideas; confronted with others – with 
cultural contamination by those who are alien – it 
becomes much more difficult to maintain that 
one’s ideas are the sole correct ideas and that the 
ideas of others are incorrect. Hence, cultural 
awareness can introduce cultural doubt, which in 
Western societies quickly spread to doubts about 
science. 
 Prior to 1960, science had been firmly 
bolted to epistemological confidence. By 1990, 
those bolts had been weakened, if not sheared. In 
the past, science would have been resistant to the 
infection of cultural doubt. A building on a solid 
foundation can resist an earthquake. If that first 
quake, however, damages the foundation, the 
building may not emerge unscathed from a second 
quake. Science withstood the earthquakes brought 
about by Kuhn, Viet Nam, and Silent Spring but 
its foundation was badly damaged. We have 
already discussed the Kuhnian effect. The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions damaged 
science’s epistemological foundation. Vietnam 
and Silent Spring damaged science’s moral 
foundation. It was bad enough to have the vivid 
TV images of Napalm right in one’s own living 
room. It was worse to learn of the disastrous 
unintended consequences of putative humanitarian 
science, such as the development of pesticides. 
 
Silent Spring created a nervous awareness 
that science and technology, followed 
blindly, could destroy life even when 
intended for beneficial non-military 
applications. It showed that scientists, 
narrow-mindedly pursuing profits, often 
acted ignorantly and implied that the 
narrowly focused specializations of 
modern science could have dangerous 
consequences. (Friberg, 2000, p. 50) 
 
Add in Bhopal, the Challenger, Chernobyl, and 
Three Mile Island and it is no wonder that the 
reputation of science has suffered in the public 
square – a situation only worsened by the fact that 
the public makes little distinction between the 
aims, methods and theories of good science and 
the use – or abuse – of scientific findings for profit 
or power motives. 
The critical point is that the cultural 
foundation on which science rests was weakened 
at the very moment in time when a plethora of 
competitors and challengers appeared. With the 
rise of cultural pluralism, people are far more 
inclined to take alien ideas seriously – ideas that 
heretofore would have been called ethnoscience 
and folklore, pseudoscience, and even quackery. 
With regard to Eastern concepts from Buddhism 
and Hinduism, popular articles and books, such as 
Fritjof Capra’s The Tao of Physics, “worked to 
confer the prestige of modern science on Asian 
mystical traditions, already highly regarded for 
their sophistication and beauty, directing open-
minded intellectual attention their way” (Friberg, 
2000, p. 50). This Eastern influence is particularly 
notable in health care where “alternative 
medicine” is very much in vogue (see for 
example: Lyons, 2001; Rosenblatt, 2001; TIME, 
2001). 
 The response in education to these cultural 
developments has been “multiculturalism 
curriculum reform” (Sleeter & Grant, 1987). 
Borrowing Haack’s (1998) analysis, educational 
reform began with pluralistic educational 
multiculturalism: “it is especially desirable in 
multicultural societies… for students to know 
something about the cultures of others with whom 
they live” (Haack, 1998, p 137). This curriculum 
perspective is clearly presented in the original 
edition of Gollnick & Chinn’s, Multicultural 
education in a pluralistic society: 
 
Multicultural education is an educational 
concept that addresses cultural diversity 
and the provision of equal educational 
opportunity in schools. For it to become a 
reality in the formal school situation, the 
typical environment must reflect a 
commitment to multicultural education. 
The cultural backgrounds of students are as 
important in developing effective 
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instructional strategies as their physical 
and mental capabilities. Educators need to 
understand the cultural strengths brought 
to class by students from diverse cultural 
backgrounds and use those cultural 
advantages to develop effective 
instructional strategies. (Gollnick & Chinn, 
1986, p. 29-30) 
 
Moreover, the importance of understanding “the 
cultural strengths brought to class by students 
from diverse cultural backgrounds” is said to be 
particularly critical in science education given that 
not all students within this diversity have achieved 
equally well. According to Luft (1998, p. 103): 
 
As classrooms become increasingly 
diverse, several researchers report that 
science instruction does not provide 
students with opportunities to do science, 
science instruction is not relevant to 
students’ lives, and science instruction 
does not result in equitable achievement 
for students on science assignments… 
Although the relationship between doing 
science, the relevancy of science, or 
science achievement and ethnicity is not 
clear, African-American, Hispanic, and 
Native American students score lower than 
their white and Asian counterparts on 
science literacy assessments. 
 
To remedy the uneven science achievement across 
cultural groups, educators have embraced 
pluralistic educational multiculturalism 
approaches that bring cultural diversity to the 
curriculum itself. The Portland African-American 
Baseline Essays (Adams, 1986) are one high 
profile, and controversial (e.g., Shanker, 1992; 
Loving & Montellano, 2000; Ortiz de Montellano, 
1996), example of curriculum innovation in this 
vein: “Students’ and staffs’ lack of knowledge 
about ethnic groups spurred Portland schools to 
begin compiling ‘baseline essays’ about the 
contributions of six major geocultural groups” 
(O’Neil, 1991/1992, p. 24). Atwater (1994 & 
1995) offers a more temperate perspective on 
multicultural science education, and indeed the 
literature during the 1990s is replete with culture 
and gender-oriented science lessons and activities. 
See Luft (1998) for a more recent review. 
For other educators and families, 
multiculturalism is taken even further and 
construed as particularistic educational 
multiculturalism: “that students… should be 
educated in their own culture” (Haack, 1998, p. 
137). For example, a major publisher of Christian-
oriented k-12 textbooks proclaims: 
 
At A Beka Book, we are unashamedly 
Christian and traditional in our approach to 
education. Because of this, we have often 
had to go against the tide of the academic 
establishment in order to meet the highest 
standards of Christian scholarship. 
(http://www.abeka.com/ABB/Catalogs/AboutABB/
AboutFrames.html) 
 
The explosive growth of the home schooling 
movement over the last 15 years provides 
dramatic evidence for the interest in culturally 
situated education (see, McDowell & Ray, 2000) 
that Haack (1998) would describe as particularistic 
educational multiculturalism 
 Science education of the 1990s, with its 
emphasis on personal, social, and cultural 
relevance, meshed very well with these rapidly 
developing multicultural ideas. At the end of the 
decade, the dean of American science education, 
Paul DeHart Hurd (2000) wrote: 
 
The current science education reform 
movement in the United States has been 
underway since 1970. From the beginning, 
there has been broad agreement that the 
traditional goals of science education are 
obsolete and that new curricula need to be 
“invented” (p 282)…. A central theme for 
reinventing science curricula is to put 
science into service for individuals and for 
society. (p. 285) 
 
This instrumentalist, utilitarian attitude easily 
fused with the now pervasive cultural awareness 
of difference. Salted by tacitly felt, growing 
doubts over Western scientific practices, 
accomplishments and attitudes, the fusion has 
yielded philosophical multiculturalism (Haack, 
1998): all knowledge is local and culturally 
situated. Thus, there are “multiple realities” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 14) – the world is lots 
of ways because people have lots of ways of 
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constructing it. There is no “preexisting reality 
‘out there’” to be discovered (Strauss & Corbin, 
1994, 279). Rather, 
 
Realities are apprehendable in the form of 
multiple, intangible mental constructions, 
socially and experientially based, local and 
specific in nature... and dependent for their 
form and content on the individual persons 
or groups holding the constructions. 
Constructions are not more or less “true,” 
in any absolute sense, but simply more or 
less informed and/or sophisticated. 
Constructions are alterable, as are their 
associated “realities.” (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994, p. 110-111) 
 
Rather than viewing truth as the fit 
between sense impressions and the real 
world, for a constructivist it is the fit of our 
sense impressions with our conceptions: 
the authority for truth lies with each of us. 
(Driver & Bell, 1986, p. 452). 
 
Furthermore, according to this relativist 
philosophy, if the “authority for truth lies with 
each of us” then it clearly makes sense that one 
would speak of Western science rather than 
simply, science. The name of a knowledge domain 
is properly preceded by a culturally identifying 
adjective as in Eastern religion, Turkish history, or 
African philosophy. One might speak of 
masculine knowledge or feminine knowledge, but 
not simply knowledge as if knowledge were 
somehow universal, being grounded in a physical 
reality common to all. Rather, being culturally 
situated, no particular knowledge domain can be 
privileged vis-à-vis other cultural situations. The 
logical next step from this elevation of culture to 
its place as artist and arbiter of knowledge is that 
all knowledge is local; “what is taken to be 
universal, value-free truths is actually situated 
knowledge” (Brickhouse, 2001, p. 282). 
The first step toward culturally situated 
knowledge is the rejection of epistemological 
universalism. The rejection of epistemological 
universalism is grounded in an 
instrumentalist/utilitarian rejection of 
epistemological realism. Our view is that the 
rejection of scientific universalism and scientific 
realism by multiculturalists has been altogether 
much too facile – marked by a lack of attention to 
the logical implications of their contentions – and 
altogether unnecessary for the purposes of 
achieving equitable science education for diverse 
learners. In a previous article we made the 
argument for scientific universalism (Cobern & 
Loving, 2001; see Cobern, 1991; Loving, 1997; 
Siegel, 2001, Southerland, 2000). We now turn 
our attention to a commonsense view of realism. 
A Metaphysical Choice 
Understanding how people come to the rejection 
of scientific realism, does not endorse such a 
decision. To the contrary, it is our position that 
most rejections of realism amongst educators and 
educational researchers are simply naive and 
ultimately will not serve the needs of students with 
regard to an education in the sciences. 
Philosophical defenses of realism abound (e.g., 
Khlentzos, 2000; Matthews, 1994; Phillips, 2000, 
Sankey, 2001) and it is not our intention to repeat 
those defenses here. It is important to note that the 
defenses argued in the science education literature 
(e.g., Slezak, 1994 a&b; Suchting, 1992 & 1995), 
we believe, are rather ineffective – not for lack of 
philosophical depth or rhetorical skill, but for a 
lack of cultural acumen – particularly with respect 
to teachers. Our approach is a commonsense 
approach that first acknowledges watershed 
cultural events and the impact they have had on 
the public understanding of epistemology. Second, 
we suggest an alternative: culturally informed, 
critical realism. We must begin however, by 
drawing attention to what it would mean if we did 
indeed believe that knowledge was socially 
constructed, substantially unrelated to the true 
nature of the world in which we live. 
 We begin by first noting that too often 
opponents of relativism over-philosophize; they 
drown their intended audience in what many 
readers consider irrelevant pedantry. Eflin, 
Glennan, and Reisch (1999, p. 114) are led to 
suggest that, “philosophical debates about realism 
should be avoided… These debates are often 
Byzantine and confusing even to those of us who 
work in them.” On the other hand, supporters of 
relativistic ideas, tend either to adopt a “taken for 
granted that this is obviously true” attitude toward 
anti-realism; or, they obfuscate the critical issues 
by adopting a strained writing style littered with 
the unique use of otherwise ordinary words. In this 
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latter group fall the very postmodernists, 
poststructuralists, and postcolonialists who 
accepted for publication, Transgressing The 
Boundaries: Towards A Transformative  
 
Hermeneutics Of Quantum Gravity, which is of 
course the gobbly-gook article by physicist Alan 
Sokal (1996) who later revealed it as a hoax. The 
problem is that technical language taken to an 
extreme becomes a convoluted, hyper-obscurantist 
private text that is, as Shakespeare wrote, full of 
sound and fury signifying nothing. Our intention is 
to present the critical arguments in common sense 
terms. Our method, reminiscent of Laudan’s four-
way discussion in Science and Relativism (1990, 
is a fictitious interrogation of a Philosophical 
Multiculturalist by a Critical Realist. The 
interrogation begins with the Critical Realist 
asking, “What is knowledge?”
 
 
The Critical Realist The Philosophical Multiculturalist 
CR: What is knowledge?   
 
 
PM: Knowledge is a coherent system of thought. Coherence 
involves conceptual coherence and instrumental accuracy. If 
our theories are conceptually coherent and instrumentally 
accurate, we may regard them as valid – some may take 
“valid” to mean “truthful.” 
 
CR: Does such coherence speak to the true nature of reality? 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: No. Reality is impenetrably shrouded. We have only 
our perceptions and the concepts we build upon those 
perceptions. 
 
 
CR: Then how can one intelligently choose between 
competing theories or ideas built upon our perceptions? 
 
 
 
 
PM: The theories that show the greatest conceptual 
coherence and instrumental accuracy are the ones we choose 
as the most valid. 
 
CR: Ok, but we know that theories are revised, changed and 
discarded from time to time. How do you account for theory 
change? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: A theory can change based on conceptual changes 
concerning the same data where new conceptualizations of 
existing data result in greater coherence – consider the 
example of Copernicus rethinking the data on which the 
Ptolemaic system was based. And, there can be perceptual 
changes (e.g., new data) that lead to theory change. Consider 
the example of Kepler working with the massive 
observational data collected by Tycho Brahe. 
 
 
CR: Are we talking about perceptual and experiential 
changes with regard to a real world? 
 
 
 11 
In Defense of Realism 
 
 
 
PM: Yes, of course. I’m no Berkeleyan idealist! 
CR: Well good. So, would you not agree that perception is 
the perception of something? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: Agreed, but as I said, what that something really is, is 
impenetrably shrouded. It is our thoughts – locally 
influenced – that we project as reality. 
 
 
 
CR: Perhaps but would you not agree that although one’s 
perceptions are strongly influenced by conceptual structure 
– locally influenced as you say – perception is not wholly 
determined by our conceptual structures? Otherwise there 
would be no difference between a perception and an 
hallucination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: First, it is not my contention that conceptual structures 
are completely determined by local influences. Second, an 
hallucination has little chance of leading to instrumentally 
accurate theory; so whether one can distinguish between an 
hallucination and perception is irrelevant. 
CR: Well then, it seems that instrumental accuracy is quite 
critical to your argument. And, if you are agreeing that that 
conceptual structures are not completely determined by local 
influences, then it seems to me that no matter how 
inaccurate a perception may be, it still must contain 
something of reality if there is any instrumental accuracy at 
all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: Perhaps but we can’t know that to be true simply 
because we have no direct access to reality – I repeat: reality 
is impenetrably shrouded. 
 
 
CR: Let’s try a thought experiment. Could a conceptually 
coherent system that is totally imaginative be instrumentally 
accurate? 
 
 
  
PM: Of course. The history of science provides many 
examples of serendipitous insight that leads to scientific 
advancement. Consider the example of Friedrich August 
Kekulé who worked out the ring-structure of benzene based 
on a dream he had! 
 
 
CR: Could a totally imaginative, but coherent system that 
predicts experiences that never occur, be of any value in 
science? 
 
 
 
 PM: No 
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CR: In fact, for a system to be considered coherent it is 
important for that system to be instrumentally accurate. Isn’t 
that so? 
 
 
 
 PM: Agreed 
 
CR: Would you also agree that theory improvement means 
that a theory is made instrumentally more accurate and 
conceptually more coherent? 
 
 
 
 PM: Agreed 
 
CR: Well then, could a speculative, coherent conceptual 
system that is (of course unbeknownst to us) in total 
ontological error, be instrumentally accurate and reliable? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: Anything is possible but I suppose such an occurrence 
would not be likely. Any accurate predictions would be 
quite fortuitous. 
 
CR: Would you then also agree that any changes to this 
speculative, coherent conceptual system that moved it even 
further into ontological error, would only decrease its 
instrumental power? 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: Again anything is possible but I think your statement is 
likely to be correct. 
 
CR: Then consider this question: could instrumental power 
ever be increased in a situation where conceptual changes to 
the system moved the system further from ontological 
reality? 
 
 
 
 PM: It is unlikely. 
 
CR: And consider this question: could instrumental power 
be improved by increasing conceptual coherence that in fact 
moves the system toward ontological reality? 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: Yes, but you can’t know that in fact this is happening. 
 
CR: But, you agreed that we are talking about perceptual 
and experiential changes with regard to a real world, and 
that perception is the perception of something. And, you 
agreed that one’s perceptions though strongly influenced by 
conceptual structure, are not completely determined. 
 
 
 
 PM: Yes, I agreed. 
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CR: Surely, we must them be able to say that perceptual and 
experiential experience are significantly grounded in 
ontological reality even when perceptual and experiential 
experience is suffused with error. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: I see where you are headed and I am not sure that I am 
willing to say that perceptual and experiential experience are 
significantly grounded in ontological reality. 
 
CR: Then we have arrived at a metaphysical choice! It is 
true that we cannot know with certainty that perceptual and 
experiential experiences are significantly grounded in 
ontological reality. It is equally true, however, that we 
cannot know for certain that perceptual and experiential 
experiences are not significantly grounded in ontological 
reality. 
 
I submit that nothing in human experience nor common 
sense suggests that it is better to accept that latter over the 
former. 
 
 
 
 PM: Go on. 
 
CR: Then we surely can also agree that theory change that 
more sharply and accurately focuses a system on ontological 
reality will improve instrumental power and will itself be 
more conceptually coherent. 
 
 
 
 
 
PM: Agreed, but I still must insist that you can’t know that 
in fact this is happening. 
 
CR: You can, given the nature of perception and 
experience. In so far as we reject the claim that the efficacy 
of a coherent system is totally independent of any 
ontological reality, the efficacy of a coherent system is at 
least partially dependent on ontological reality. Therefore, 
knowledge that increases conceptual coherence and 
instrumental power is knowledge that more accurately 
corresponds with reality. There is simply no other rational 
way to account for human ability to increase instrumental 
power other than that our knowledge has the characteristics 
of verisimilitude vis-à-vis the real world. 
 
 
 
 PM: Sigh…. 
Realism Reconsidered: Dürer Vs Kandinsky 
The Critical Realist drives home the point that 
there is simply no other rational way to account 
for human ability to increase instrumental power 
other than that knowledge has the characteristics 
of verisimilitude vis-à-vis the real world. This is 
realism, that: 
 
 
the world is as it is independently of how 
humans take it to be. The objects the world 
contains, together with their properties and 
the relations they enter into, fix the world’s 
nature and these objects exist 
independently of our ability to discover 
they do. Unless this is so, realists argue, 
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none of our beliefs about our world could 
be objectively true since true beliefs tell us 
how things are and beliefs are objective 
when true or false independently of what 
anyone might think…. Nonetheless, 
realism is controversial. (Khlentzos, 2000) 
 
This controversy – the assertion, as made by the 
Philosophical Multiculturalist, that objective 
knowledge about a real world is unobtainable – is 
an old one. Mortimer Adler noted that the question 
of how ideas can actually represent knowledge of 
an objective reality underlines all the unresolved 
“riddles and perplexities of later empiricism” 
(1974, p. x). The 18th century Scottish philosopher 
Thomas Reid, however, resolved this controversy 
in a way that many teachers of science today will 
find quite compelling. Reid was one of the 
founders of the “common sense” school of 
philosophy, or what Haack (1998, p. 156) calls 
“critical common-sensism.” 
What this means is that Reid is not 
concerned to answer certain questions of 
justification that can seem enormously 
pressing to us in certain philosophical 
moods. He is not, for instance, interested in 
providing a justification for our belief in 
the external world by appeal to first 
principles of some sort. For instance, Reid 
feels he can refute skeptical hypotheses – 
such as Descartes’s hypothesis of an evil 
demon who makes us believe that the 
world is the way we take it to be when it is 
really vastly different – simply by showing 
that such a hypothesis is no more likely to 
be true than the common-sensical belief 
that the world is much the way we perceive 
it to be. Since the belief in the external 
world is a dictate of common sense, it is, 
Reid thinks, as justified as it needs to be 
when it is shown to be on the same footing 
as any alternative. Justification, therefore, 
does not necessarily require providing 
positive reasons in favor of common-
sensical beliefs; common sense beliefs 
could be adequately justified simply by 
undermining the force of the reasons in 
favor of alternatives to common sense. 
(Yaffe, 2000). 
 
We can apply this view of alternatives to the 
“metaphysical choice” in the dialogue between the 
Critical Realist and the Philosophical 
Multiculturalist. The Critical Realist asserts: 
 
Then we have arrived at a metaphysical 
choice! It is true that we cannot know with 
certainty that perceptual and experiential 
experiences are significantly grounded in 
ontological reality. However, it is equally 
true that we cannot know for certain that 
perceptual and experiential experiences are 
not significantly grounded in ontological 
reality. 
 
Reid’s response would be that without very strong 
reason indeed, one should not reject that which 
human experience and common sense suggests is 
true. 
 This is not to deny that this position has 
difficulties and certainly the proponents of realism 
do not hold the unreflective position opponents of 
realism in education seem to think that they do. 
The purported difficulties for realism such as 
changes in science over time and the differences 
amongst cultures have long been recognized. 
Realists have always recognized that knowledge 
changes and develops. The realist recognizes that 
knowledge at any given time only approximates 
reality and that the quest for accuracy is endless. 
The realist understands that an individual constructs 
knowledge of reality from sense perceptions and 
from conjectural theories, which are subject to many 
influences. Knowledge is fallible (Pierce, 1931). 
What is the cause of fallibility? In the past one 
would most likely cite the inherent limitations of 
experimental efforts and intellectual acumen; and 
of course the limited nature of the scientific 
knowledge base at any one time. In other words 
our best current efforts are limited by the lack of 
experimental and intellectual perfection. What has 
changed in light of cultural, historical and 
philosophical studies is that in addition to these 
internal limitations we now recognize a new range 
of external limitations: metaphysics, cultural 
factors, predispositions, prejudice, power 
relationships, politics, ideology and economics. 
 
Hence, the realist is not naive, but critical 
(Polkinghorne 1991). Knowledge of reality is not 
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like a photograph, but more like representational art. 
In a Dürer painting, for example: 
 
there is little of sensuous beauty; but the 
rude, stark outlines of life itself, the literal-
minded dwelling on the last detail of the 
imaginative vision, the intense seriousness 
of the preoccupation with the furniture of 
practical life, whether in the creased strength 
of those faces of his merchant friends – “I 
think the more exact and like a man a 
picture is the better the work,” he said ... 
(Randall, 1940, p. 127) 
 
Representational art and photographs, however, 
are not easily confused. The vicissitude of 
knowledge is widely recognized in 
representational art. The goal may be exactitude, 
but the goal is ever elusive. Too often opponents 
of realism take realism to be an “either/or” sort of 
thing; either we know the real world without error, 
or we cannot know the real world at all. But there 
is a more nuanced view of realism, a critical 
realism, that, “recognizes that there is always 
some element of construction in knowledge, but 
maintains the common sense view that the world 
external to or prior to our thought places limits on 
what can count as knowledge” (Lillegard, 2001). 
 It would seem that those who embrace non-
realism have grown tired of the quest to know 
reality and thus declare reality unimportant. It is 
only the construction, in and of itself, that is 
important. To carry further the artistic metaphor, 
radically, culturally, or socially constructed 
knowledge is a form of aesthetic modernism as one 
finds in modern art: 
 
Modernism ... denies the primacy of an 
outside reality, as given. It seeks either to 
rearrange that reality, or to retreat to the 
self's interior, to private experience as the 
source of its concerns and aesthetic 
preoccupations ... There is an emphasis on 
the self as touchstone of understanding and 
on the activity of the knower rather than the 
character of the object as the source of 
knowledge ... Thus one discerns the 
intentions of modern painting ... to break up 
ordered space ... to bridge the distance 
between object and spectator, to “thrust” 
itself on the viewer and establish itself 
immediately by impact. (Bell, 1976, p.110, 
112) 
 
As with a Wassily Kandinsky painting, there is no 
intention to represent the natural world. The value 
of the art is in its impact. The value of locally 
constructed knowledge is also in its impact, but in 
science that impact is instrumental accuracy. One 
does not worry that knowledge match reality; only 
that knowledge allows the useful prediction of 
experience, its impact. But what metaphysic does 
instrumental accuracy reinforce? The eminent 
physicist Cecil Frank Powell noted, “all our 
experience of the development of science suggests 
that there is indeed an order in nature which we 
can discover...” (1972, p. 5). We go even further 
and assert that instrumental accuracy – whether in 
the form of Traditional Ecological Knowledge8 
amongst First Nations people of Canada or quantum 
physics from the Fermi Lab – reinforces the 
estimation that knowledge is approaching reality, 
and in fact undermines the radical notion of 
philosophical multiculturalism. 
 The concepts of realism and universalism 
in science are often perceived as threatening to 
other ways of knowing, particularly indigenous 
and traditional ways of knowing. This perception 
is not without warrant (see Ladriere, 1977). As 
European contact with peoples from far away 
places increased, European “perceptions of the 
material superiority of their own cultures, 
particularly as manifested in scientific thought and 
technological innovation, shaped their attitudes 
toward and interaction with peoples they 
encountered overseas” (Adas, 1989, p. 4). Why? 
Adas goes on to explain. 
 
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, most European thinkers 
concluded that the unprecedented control 
over nature made possible by Western 
science and technology proved that 
European modes of thought and social 
organization corresponded much more 
closely to the underlying realities of the 
universe than did those of any other people 
or society, past or present. (Adas, 1989, p. 
7) 
 
                                                          
8 For more on Traditional Ecological Knowledge, see Snively & Corsiglia 
(2001). 
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Western teachers carried this sense of superiority 
based on science and technology into the colonial 
education system. In a rare moment of honest 
reflection, one such teacher admitted: “In common 
with so many others, I used to think that we could 
get rid of Bantu ‘stupidities’ by suitable talks on 
natural science, hygiene, etc., as if the natural 
sciences could subvert their traditional lore or 
their philosophy” (Tempels, 1959, p. 30). Tempels 
recognized resistance to invading ideas and 
wondered if the invaders were doing the right 
thing. Development theorists through the 1960s 
had few such doubts. Economic development 
theory was based on displacing traditional beliefs 
by modern ones compatible with science and 
technology (Rostow, 1971). In 1962, the 
prestigious journal Science published an 
approving article about movement toward a single 
world culture dominated, of course, by science 
(Dedijer, 1962). 
 This type of scientistic idealism explicitly 
directed toward the non-western world now seems 
far removed, but other forms are alive and well. 
Bunge (1996), Dawkins (1986), Gross, Levitt and 
Lewis (1996), and Mahner and Bunge (1996) 
come readily to mind. Nevertheless, the high-
octane rhetoric of an outspoken few should not be 
taken as proof that realism and universalism in 
science are inherently scientistic beliefs. Nor 
should one conclude that the best way to protect 
other ways of knowing from the imperialistic 
behavior of scientistic true believers is to adopt a 
relativistic, instrumental stance toward knowledge. 
One should consider, for example, that no First 
Nations person thinks of Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge (TEK) as instrumental or viable. TEK 
exists because it is thought to be true knowledge 
about the real world. The concepts of 
“instrumentalism” and “viability” are of Western 
origin; and to the extent that anti-realism is 
promoted based on these ideas, an imperialism is 
being practiced that is just as menacing as any of 
the 19th century forms. Indeed, realism is the 
philosophical domain that invites indigenous 
knowledge – actually any proposed knowledge 
about the physical world – to bid for respect. 
Regardless of its origins, regardless of local 
influences, any proposed knowledge that provides 
insight on our physical world can gain a hearing, 
because realism is literally the common ground we 
all share. What realists want are rational or 
cognitively constructed warrants for believing 
knowledge to be true or to represent reality – 
evidence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is past time to get over the false claim that 
science does not really provide an objective, 
universal but approximate description of the real 
world – without forgetting that science is 
imperfect, incomplete and fallible; and is not the 
only source of knowledge that we as humans find 
of value. Our contention is that professional 
educators have been all altogether too facile in their 
rejection of epistemological realism. If time is taken 
to carefully examine the logical consequences of 
anti-realism, we think that most would agree that 
what “works” is knowledge about a real world 
shared by all. Moreover, universal scientific realism 
is not the cause of the epistemological imperialism 
that is so offensive to professional educators and 
which drives them to philosophical 
multiculturalism. Epistemological imperialism is the 
direct consequence of scientism. Attacking realism 
is thus wrongheaded; but worse, it is self-defeating. 
Attacking realism undercuts the very ground on 
which other contributions to knowledge about 
Nature can gain a hearing and respect beyond local 
borders. 
 Following Haack (1998), we believe that 
science is well deserving of distinction because it 
has been such a powerful tool for the accurate 
description of Nature and illumination of natural 
processes. Privilege is another matter. Science 
cannot answer all the questions humans are wont to 
ask; thus science can only be privileged within the 
boundaries of its purpose. As one noted scientist 
remarked: “for all its explanatory powers, science 
is very limited in the kind of questions that it can 
address well: how things work, problems 
amenable to quantification, and deriving general 
laws about the properties of matter” (Alexander, 
2001). Other fields of study are called upon to 
answer and illuminate other questions that humans 
have. Different people ask different questions 
calling upon various forms of knowledge. It is thus 
appropriate that educators promote a pluralistic 
view of knowledge: pluralism not relativism, 
distinction not privilege. 
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